Pragmatism, Logic and Language: Roots and Perspectives of an Unity Beyond Dualism

AGUIAR, José Arlindo de
Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais de Igarassu, FACIG; Faculdade Maurício de Nassau - Brasil
arlindoaguiar@bol.com.br

Resumo: Lógica e filosofia da linguagem dividem com o pragmatismo o título de caracterizadoras da tradição anglo-saxã na filosofia. Mas a interconexão entre os dois temas nem sempre salta aos olhos.
Podemos com alguma facilidade analisar formalmente com nossas diversas versões atuais da lógica os princípios do pragmatismo; inversamente há espaço para abordar os sistemas lógicos sob o viés pragmático. Aqui se tenta delinear a lógica que pode existir inerentemente aos princípios do pragmatismo, e aquilo que de pragmático se esconde na mais pura filosofia analítica.
O caminho proposto leva em consideração um indício histórico da era em que a lógica e a linguagem estavam indissociadas do mundo sobre o qual falavam. Um mundo que chamava aos objetos "pragmata", "aquilo com que lidamos". A Grécia berço da filosofia mantém em seu pensamento a união originária que conecta a raiz pragmática e a linguagem. A linguagem, ou discurso grego se consubstancia no "lógos", traduzido mesmo até simplesmente por conversa.
A comparação de um mundo em que cada objeto se fazia objeto por sua função, e em que esta mesma funcionalidade se estabelece como organização lógica do discurso reflexo da natureza, com o nosso mundo deve dar perspectiva ao que podemos modernamente entender por função contemporânea da lógica. Ou que lógica podemos de fato chamar de pragmática aquela(s) para as quais encontramos uma realidade coincidente e na qual podemos aplicá-la com finalidades específicas ou a tentativa de formalizar a própria intimidade da relação entre meios e finalidades.
A título de exemplo no primeiro caso consideremos as criações abstratas da lógica matemática, no segundo a abordagem dos objetos de conhecimento como primitivos objetos "à-mão" contribuição Heideggeriana à fenomenologia, talvez sua parcela de débito com o empiricismo radical de James, admirado pelo seu mestre Husserl.

Palavras-chave: Pragmatismo. Lógica. Linguagem. Fenomenologia.

 

Walking Through the Wheatfield of Van Gogh and Agnes Denes - Aesthetical Premisses as Basis for a Pragmatics of Philosophy of Nature

ALMEIDA, Maria Celeste de; COSTA e SILVA, Tiago
Universidade Federal da Bahia - UFBA
Centro Universitário Senac São Paulo
mcawanner@hotmail.com
tkunst@gmail.com

Abstract: The present essay intents to provide an overview of how a determined aesthetic effect taken from a peculiar work of art has the ability to suggest - according to its very ontological nature - the appearance of a conception of a Philosophy of Nature where, from the starting point of that contemplative moment, the idea of the otherness appears. The idea of non-ego, followed subsquentially by the very notion of cognitive power, which is permitted only by the objectivity of that other element, for it determines the cognoscenti mind to create such representations according to the very nature of this object. Right away the mind creates representations and interpretants. It appears also, altogether with the first notion of contemplation, the idea of an originary common eidetic matrix, which is part of the entire reality - the Nature itself - and furthermore - appears the idea that the human mind, with its particular cognoscenti apparatus is nothing more than a small aspect of Nature for it is but a practical bearing of the evolutionary process of Nature.
This article will address those questions by examining the painting of Vincent Van Gogh "Wheatfield with Crows", (painted in 1880), and the contemporary work (also considered in the concept of the contemporary art as EarthArt) of Agnes Denes "Wheatfield: a Confrontation", (constructed in 1989).
Van Gogh through his recognizable style, by that period known as Expressionist, incorporates brighter colors - oil on canvas - into his uniquely own way of representation. It provokes sensitive effects to the viewer, as well as a semantic displacement for beyond that represented subject - although it still identified in the image - highlighting the vitality and already existing originality characteristics presented in the real landscape that inspired him. However, instead of oil on canvas Agnes Denes's art was a two-acre field of wheat planted in a vacant lot in New York City financial center. This work has its own ability to enthrall significant material characteristics into a semantic displacement environment, and proposes a certain aesthetic effect that provides the loss of analytic dimension of a canvas at the same time that also provides the integration of the cognoscenti mind with the work, that is, after the fusion between subject and object, the return to the reflexive moment regains other dimensions. Therefore, the methodological strategy for this essay, will be a verification of the ontological nature of both works of art, through a study of their powers of meaning, which will provide a reflection about the relation between a specific aesthetic effect and the suggestion of a pragmatic approach for a Philosophy of Nature - based in the idea of a contemplative moment - whose cosmologic origin dates back to Schelling and Plato.

Keywords: Aesthetics. Semiotics. Epistemology. Contemporary Art. Ontology. Philosophy of Nature. Metaphysics.

 

On Relativism in Richard Rorty's Neopragmatism

ARAÚJO, Inês Lacerda
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná – PUC/PR
ineslara@.matrix.com.br

Resumo: Rorty leva adiante o pragmatismo, renovando-o. Inspirado em Wittgenstein, Dewey e Heidegger, ele critica a tradição filosófica centrada na representação como obstáculo à cultura pragmatizada. Nela vale a conversação, a justificação, o modelo para o conhecimento não é a mente como espelho da natureza, mas as práticas culturais através das quais é possível obter verdade objetiva. Mas esta não é o centro de um procedimento epistemológico, e sim resultado da aplicação de procedimentos justificados em contextos do discurso normal. Ao invés de buscar um algoritmo comum, um fundamento sólido e inabalável, é preciso abrir a filosofia para a conversação. O rótulo de relativismo (visto este como perigo para a verdade, para a ética, para a política) não é o mais apropriado para caracterizar seu pensamento; como Rorty põe em xeque a relação esquema/conteúdo e nisso segue Davidson, a verdade não depende de esquema; o idealismo e o relativismo concernem mais os filósofos sistemáticos que propõem critérios para o conhecimento. Se o conhecimento for visto não como método para chegar à Verdade, mas como parte de procedimentos que muitas vezes melhoram a compreensão que temos de nós, então à filosofia caberá o papel de auxiliar na conversação da humanidade e não de juiz cultural. Se a mente não for vista como cuba que contém idéias, que representa a realidade, mas como certo elemento usado para caracterizar algumas de nossas atividades, compreensível em certos jogos de linguagem, então não precisamos de uma ciência que nos decifre

Palavras-chave: Relativismo. Neo-Pragmatismo. Verdade. Representação.

 

Bioethics. Paternity Determination and the Pragmatic Conception of Law

BELTRÃO, Taciana Cahu
Associação Caruaruense de Ensino Superior (Asces) - Brasil
tacianabeltrao@gmail.com

Abstract: Our hypothesis, to be worked in this paper, aims at to debate the eminently pragmatic character of the legal activity in regards to the production of decisions, however the jurists don't perceive that certainty tests are much more in the practical experience than in the nature of the things objective considerate.Then, and intents to understand this kind of perceive the juridical phenomenon through pragmatic method, our work uses the question of filiation determination in civil-contitutional view as paradigm. This point of view is based on biological bond, while component element, but nor always with basic character, as criteria of the paternity. In this sense, others bases are today used by some judges who intents observe the experience and understands, for example, that affective relation will be able to prevail for such recognition. Thus, the judge needs think about old institutes, looking for being human dignity development, consequently observing the social needs and don´t only formal aspect of law. This point of view shows the importance of Peirce´s affirmation, considerated as first pragmatism conception, when says the truth is the set of her practical effects. This paper has the hypothesis, based on way of decide cases of paternity determination, that the decisive transformation that could inaugurate a new juridical reflection is that knowledge which moves away all kind of dualisms - these are so common in law, as example, public vs. private; abstract vs. concrete; "sein" vs. "solen"; zetetic vs. dogmatic - finally, debate about the contributions of experience to philosophical reflection of law. The big obstacle is the predominant theory of law, so traditional and conservative to think the news possibilities of questions like "biodireito" - new area of judicial practical. This is our main question to be worked.

Keywords: Bioethics. Paternity Determination. Pragmatic Conception of Law.

 

Creative Love and Evolutionary Processes in the Cosmology of Charles Sanders Peirce

BIZARRO, Maristela Sanches
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
maristela.m@gmail.com

Abstract: In 1893, Charles Peirce wrote an important text in The Monist periodic. This text constitutes an important base to establish the presuppositions of his cosmology. In this article, "Evolutionary Love", Peirce studies the conventional models in the context of his writings and concludes that these models can't, in an effective way, explain Nature's evolutionary processes. So, Peirce purposes a third model in which a creative principle, in the process of emanating a myriad of objects has the power to put them in relation to themselves and attract them back in a cyclical form that generates new elements from these syntheses.
Peirce concludes that this model has a similar form to the Love described in the Gospel of John and nominates it Creative Love. Based in this theoretical posture, the aim of this essay is to investigate the passage from a contemplation experience to action and its further reflection that is linked to evolutionary processes, observing that from the question: "why is an objective idealism announced from a contemplation experience?" raise out the main ideas of the theoretical course proposed by the present essay.

Keywords: Creative Love. Evolution. Cosmology. Pragmatism. Epistemology.

 

The Place of Pragmatism in the Arborescent Diagram of 66 Classes of Signs Called SignTree

BORGES, Priscila Monteiro
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, PUC/SP - Brasil
primborges@gmail.com

Abstract: This paper intends to show a connection between semiotic and pragmatism through the reading of the sign tree diagram. The SignTree is a visual diagram that illustrates in detail Peirce´s 66 classes of signs. Its arborescent format represents the semiotic structure, and its reading shows how semiose is connected to Peirce´s philosophy. This reading will focus on the tip of the branches because that area is the precise location of the 3 trichotomies, which are composed of the final interpretant itself; the relation between final interpretant and sign; and the triadic relation between sign, dynamic object and final interpretant. A special attention is given to these three trichotomies because they indicate the possibility of the infinite growth of signs. According to Peirce, there are three kinds of final interpretants: gratific, practical and pragmatic. It is not a coincidence that the word pragmatic is used to describe the final interpretant - whose nature is of thirdness. The final interpretant introduces into semiose the concept of being in future, making the continuity of signs possible. Knowing that the triadic relation of signs corresponds to thought, and that the final interpretant is present in that relation, then thought might have the characteristic of being in future. Therefore it is possible to find out the purpose of thought and finally make the connection between semiotic and pragmatism. In the last trichotomy Peirce describes three kinds of thought: instinct, experience and formal. The diagram shows that of the 66 classes of signs, thought is found in 55 classes as an instinct, in 10 classes as an experience, and in one as formal. The objective of this paper is to understand the reasons why these three types of thoughts are arranged in that particular way, and to comprehend the connection between Peirce´s semiotic and pragmatism. This paper proposes that the only class of sign in which formal thought appears represents the pragmatic maxim: concrete reasonableness, and that the other classes of signs represent the realization of the pragmatic maxim. Those classes of signs in which thought appears as an experience are the ones that represent an idea put in act. And the greater number of classes of signs in which thought appears as an instinct represent the aim of the self-controlled thought: to construct habits of action.

Keywords: Semeiotic. Pragmatism. Diagram. SignTree.

 

The Notion of Continuous Flux of Experience: the Contribution of Dewey to Cognitive Science

BROENS, Mariana Claudia. ANDRADE, Heloísa Benvenutti. PILAN, Fernando César
Universidade Estadual Paulista - UNESP. F.F.C. Marília - Brasil
mbroens@marilia.unesp.br
eloisabenvenutti@yahoo.com.br
pilan@marilia.unesp.br

Abstract: This work aims to investigate the notion of continuous flux of experience proposed by John Dewey and its possible contribution to Philosophy of mind and to Cognitive Science. Dewey elaborates a theory which presents a conception of experience that involves all the dimensions of living actions, not only giving privilege to the role that actions play in scientific knowledge. According to Dewey, the traditional theories of knowledge do not consider experience adequately, for those theories only point out the relevance of experience in the production of theories, dissociating experience from its environments. Thus, daily events are not taken into consideration in the production of knowledge and so philosophy becomes an abstract entity free floating over and above life and even beyond it. On the basis of the notion of continuous flux of experience, Dewey refutes the rationalist theories in adopting an evolutionary perspective that envisages to point out the continuity that links actions with its environments. We shall show that Dewey's notion can contribute to the investigation of the cognitive processes actually in course of study in the Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science.

Keywords: Pragmatism. Continuous Flux of Experience. Habit. Knowledge.

 

Fallibilism and the Future of Pragmatism

BROWN, Sean
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
seaabrow@iupui.edu

Abstract: In his 2002 Reinventing Pragmatism: American Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century, Joseph Margolis asserts the direction pragmatism must take if it is to be the dominant American philosophy. Thanks to Rorty and Putnam, interest has been revived in pragmatism. But, Margolis aptly remarks, reviving pragmatism is not enough. Pragmatism needs to be reinvented if it is to succeed. Most importantly, Margolis argues, the new pragmatism must renew a commitment to fallibilism in conjunction with some form of historicism. That is to say, for Margolis fallibilism should play a central role in the new pragmatism. In my paper I examine Margolis's notion of fallibilism, specifically his distinction between the fallibilisms of Peirce and Dewey, as well as the reasons why he prefers Dewey's fallibilism above Peirce's.
In this examination I will trace the Houser-Margolis debate insofar as it has unfolded itself in the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, beginning with Houser's 2004 presidential address. Houser's main objection to Margolis is that he misread Peirce and that as a consequence his favoring of Dewey is misguided. Though Margolis concedes the former, he rejects the latter claim, maintaining that the future of pragmatism still lies with Dewey, not Peirce. Revisiting the debate, I seek to clear up some of the confusion, so as to get a better idea of the classical pragmatist position that Margolis thinks needs reinventing.

 

Two Notes on Spinoza's "Experimentalist Mind", According to Peirce

CARDOSO JR., Hélio R.
Universidade Estadual Paulista UNESP - Assis
herebell@uel.br

Abstract: We find Spinoza among the metaphysicians whom Peirce admires the most. Peirce's compliment to this thinker is due to the fact that his metaphysics would stand for an "experimentalist mind". The present paper aims at, exactly, pointing out some elements from spinozan philosophy which, hypothetically, might perform the experimentalist character praised by Peirce. Such main purpose will be fulfilled through two notes, which might, not only demonstrate the Spinoza's experimentalist problems, but trace as well their echoes in certain important passages at Peirce's "Scientific Metaphysics". In fact, Espinosa dedicated himself, steadily, to the construction of the so called ontological parallelism between bodies and ideas. Being this parallelism one of the main thesis supported in Spinoza's Ethics, it establishes, decisively, a pragmatist link between the knowledge (ideas) and the world of the action (bodies). Really, according to Spinoza, continuity runs between ideas and bodies, so that its breakup would make ethics fall into a simple moral system. From a practical point of view, according to Spinoza, whenever a new relation between bodies is established, it requires new ways of action. For Peirce, also, new relations unchain beliefs that shall be established, drawing a new habit, which has the strength to make a shift in the conduct of life. The same agreement is to be found from the point of view of the ideas or in the epistemological domain. As Spinoza indicates, the sprouting of a new relation between bodies compels us to knowledge, since new relations require new ideas. As for Peirce, we have the feeling of satisfaction whenever we are impelled from doubt to belief, so that new mental habits are also the epistemological guarantee that something new appeared. In short, for Spinoza as much for Peirce, it would apply certain resonance between the ethical joy and the satisfaction that follows knowledge. That's why, hypothetically, Spinoza's experimentalist mind caught Peirce's attention.

Keywords: Peirce. Spinoza. Pragmatism. Metaphysics. Experimentalism.

 

Imagination, Concentration, Generalization: Peirce on the Reasoning Abilities of the Mathematician

CAMPOS, Daniel G.
Brooklyn College - City University of New York, USA
dcampos@brooklyn.cuny.edu

Abstract: In this paper I propose to discuss the epistemic conditions for the possibility of mathematical discovery that are implied by Peirce's logic of mathematical inquiry. Since Peirce develops an open-ended, systematic view of mathematical practice, my proposed treatment of the conditions for the possibility of innovation should not be ad hoc; it should rather reflect and indeed follow from the structure of Peirce's open-ended system. In other words, this account of the epistemic abilities required for mathematical reasoning should follow from the irreducible categories of quality, relation, and generality-or firstness, secondness, and thirdness-that are intrinsic to mathematical practice. More specifically, I submit that the necessary epistemic conditions for the possibility of mathematical discovery ought to be those abilities required by the mathematician in order to detect and investigate with precision the qualitative, relational, and general aspects of a mathematical hypothesis. (This claim relies on Peirce's conception of mathematics as the study what is true of a hypothetical state of things and on his view of mathematical method as experimentation upon diagrams or icons that embody formal relations.) Accordingly, Peirce describes the mathematician's reasoning abilities as the powers of imagination, concentration, and generalization. I interpret all three as different semiotic abilities to reason with mathematical icons. The imagination consists in "the power of distinctly picturing to ourselves intricate configurations" such as mathematical diagrams (MS 252). Concentration is "the ability to take up a problem, bring it to a convenient shape for study, make out the gist of it, and ascertain without mistake just what it does and does not involve" (MS 252). The power of generalization is the ability "to see that what seems at first a snarl of intricate circumstances is but a fragment of a harmonious and comprehensible whole" (MS 252). These abilities come into play at different stages of the mathematical process of experimentation upon diagrams. Finally, on the basis of this account I proceed to draw out the pragmatic upshot for developing a method of training students in mathematical reasoning.

Keywords: Peirce. Mathematics. Logic of inquiry. Discovery. Imagination. Generalization.

 

Neuronal Information: Pragmatically Meaningful Information?

CARVALHO, Maria Amelia de
Universidade Estadual Paulista "Julio de Mesquita Filho" - UNESP - Campus de Marília - Brasil
mariamel@marilia.unesp.br

Abstract: The term neuronal information was usually thought in cognitive neuroscience as causal correlation between the probability of neuronal trigger toward certain stimulus. This conception of information has presented problems in
relation to the neuroscience traditional paradigms since as it comes from Mathematics Communication Theory, information in this case, it does not convey meaning. Today current neurocientific investigations of information within the nervous system is associated with semantic content, and thus it is necessary to take into account an interpretation of this content within a perspective of the system itself in which the information process occurs. However, we argue that of information the conception from a naturalized view of the nervous system, proposed by Moreno & Barandiaran (2006) may contribute to current theoretical investigations as it presents a neuronal information conception that conveys meaning. Taking into account Peirce´s Pragmatism, the objective of this paper is to investigate whether or not this naturalized conception can be thought as pragmatically meaningful information. Thus, with the help of a diagrammatic construction, this paper deals with a reflection on the role of neuronal information concerning body perception- action conducts.

Keywords: Naturalized epistemology. Neuroscience of philosophy. Neuronal information. Pragmatism. Perception-action.

 

A Pragmatic Approach to the Foundation of Human Rights

CATÃO, Adrualdo de Lima
Universidade Federal de Alagoas, UFAL, Maceió, Brasil
adrualdocatao@gmail.com

Abstract: This work places a pragmatic approach to ethics and the fundament of Human Rights. The discursive environment in which the debates concerning Human Rights take place must be taken as incommensurable, for the participants do not share the same linguistic presuppositions. This work, however, does not intend to promote cultural relativism, or that different ethical languages are untranslatable. Incommensurability, here, is presented as related to levels of understanding, not as a halt to end the discussion, but as a stimulant factor. The Kuhntian notion of linguistic paradigm is adapted, being presented as the discursive environment where it is possible to establish some level of agreement, so as to enable a coherent and meaningful communication. The thesis is that Human Rights discourse cannot be granted unconditional amidst the existence of so many different ethical paradigms present in the most diverse background of distinct societies and cultures. But that does not mean that ethical discussion must be abandoned to be replaced with an irrational or a relativistic posture, nor does it mean that the Human Rights discourse is impracticable or that it cannot be addressed to non-western cultures. The approach proposed here emphasizes that intolerant postures must not be justified simply by the fact that they are "truths" integrating a determined paradigm, and therefore could not be questioned but for criteria belonging to the referred paradigm. The commensurable-incommensurable dualism (Rorty) comes as a difference of level, not gender, demonstrating that the discourse of Human Rights can be addressed more commensurably or more incommensurably depending on whether the participants are, more or less inserted in the same ethical paradigm. An absolute incommensurability is not defended here. Finally, the pragmatic posture denies, at the same time, authoritarianism and ethical relativism, working as a theoretical proposal to visualize the Human Rights discourse as a guideline to human education for a better world. In that sense, a pragmatic view will leave aside metaphysical questions concerning the existence of universal rights in order to concentrate the energy of human beings into education and democratic inclusion (Dewey), that is, education to increase the identification of the beings which can be called "humans" in the blatant defence of a democratic ethics.

Keywords: Human Rights. Universalism. Ethical Relativism. Democracy.

 

A Modern "Problem of Universals": John Stuart Mill, Rival to Peirce

CHEVALIER, Jean-Marie
Paris-XII ; IJN/CNRS/EHESS ; ENS Ulm (France)
jeanmariechevalier@yahoo.fr

Abstract: It may be that the unity of pragmatism is on the side of its rivals. Adopting F.E. Abbot's view that the battle of nominalism and realism, far from being fought out by the end of the fifteenth century, remains the "underlying problem of problems", Peirce reopens the medieval Problem of Universals, taking side for a Scotistic realism against the nominalism that had been prevailing from Ockham up to almost every modern philosopher. If Peirce's realism is quite well known, one seldom notices that it was built against a great and popular philosophy, namely John Stuart Mill's. On the threshold of his career, Peirce choses Mill as his Ockhamist alter ego.
This New Quarrel of Universals revives the opposition between Ockhamists and "Dunces" on the ground of modernity, i.e. the logic of empirical sciences. Thus, the problem of the reality of universals depends on the question whether one can infer from particular to general in science. It deals with induction, know in contemporary debates as Hume's problem, but closely related to the questions of the uniformity of nature and the existence of laws, both discussed by Mill.
Mill's logic is examined in number of Peirce's first writings until 1870. Peirce tackles the question again from 1900 to 1911 and gives a fatal blow to the works of this "very strong but Philistine philosopher". The evolution of Peirce's criticism mirrors the building of his pragmaticism. The early remarks mainly bear on Mill's theory of syllogism -his completely wrong definition of inference- and on the useless rule of uniformity to warrant our inductions. The last writings reproach Mill for refusing the reality of the laws of nature, and for adopting a so-called positivistic position, but " of most metaphysicky description ". Peirce's unsurprising accusation of psychologism toward Mill's logic (1865) turns in 1909 to be viewed as a symptom of a metaphysical construction far away from true science. Thus, Peirce's evolution can be read at the light of his criticism of Mill: initially prisoner of classical logic difficulties, he builds, from a logical standpoint, a whole scientific metaphysic. Even what appears as invariable attacks on Mill (his nominalism, his mistake about connotation) actually follows the variations of his realism.
Peirce tends to see Mill as the archetype of what he philosophically abhors. That's why he eventually claims that Mill is inconsistent -which opinion is supported by the nine, sometimes contradictory versions of the Logic that were published in Peirce's lifetime. Peirce has made up a rival pulled in the several directions taken by other thinkers Peirce associates him : Mill appears a positivist with Comte, nominalist with Ockham, individualist with Bentham, bad probabilist with Laplace, etc. A way to say that Mill was all but a pragmatist. Obviously the line of Mill's work is completely drawn according to the shadow Peirce's system projects.
A study of the unpublished Peirce-Mill correspondence, completely neglected by Peirce scholarship, sheds new light on their relation.

Keywords: C.S. Peirce. J.S. Mill. Pragmatism. Induction. Nominalism. Universals.

 

Abduction and Creativity: Meaning Construction and Aesthetic Appreciation

COCCHIERI, Tiziana & OLIVEIRA, Luis Felipe
Universidade Estadual Paulista - UNESP; Universidade Estadual de Campinas - UNICAMP
cocchieri@gmail.com
oliveira.lf@gmail.com

Abstract: In this paper we establish the relation among the concepts of aesthetic appreciation, abduction and creativity. We start presenting the concept of abductive reasoning, one of the three principal forms of logical inference described by C.S. Peirce in his pragmatic philosophy. Within the relation of abduction, creativity and meaning construction, abduction can be understood as the kind of reasoning that culminates in a temporary assimilation of an explanative hypothesis, which holds conjectural procedures; i.e., abduction is the logical operation that can introduce new ideas. With other logical inferences, deduction and induction, there is no creative process, for anything one can know is already present in the premises, as a matter of necessity or probability respectively. In other words, abduction is the only inferential form that makes knowledge acquisition possible. In a second moment, after we have verified how that relation of abductive reasoning and creativity occurs, we present the idea that aesthetic appreciation might be understood as an act of meaning construction. Thus, artistic meaning in this perspective cannot be considered as an already-given object enclosed in the work, neither as a purely subjective and non-formal elaboration, nor as an extrinsic imposition furnished by art criticism. Conversely, we propose the hypothesis that meaning in art is a process of work reading not different from other processes of meaning construction in several domains; it is a particular case of a more general and methodic process described by Peirce, that operates over the three forms of logical inference. Lastly, we illustrate our hypothesis with the analysis of some pieces of art, in music and in visual arts.

Keywords: Abduction. Meaning. Art. Aesthetic Appreciation.

 

Another of "Descartes' Errors": Peirce and the Natural Rationality of the Emotions

DEROY, Ophelia
Université Paris XII
ophelia.deroy@laposte.net

Abstract: When talking about the emotions, people will mention James. When talking about Peirce, they will underline his methods of inquiry, his logic, his conception of truth. Both had important things to say on each of this domain, but as a result, their proximity is made quite problematic. More importantly, the specific role and account of emotions given by Peirce is quite often ignored. But how are emotions to be reconciled with reason? What kind of role do they play in the functioning of the mind? Which emotions are then at stake, and how can a Peircean account for them? In this paper, I give an overview of Peirce's theory of emotions and their role in reasoning, while underlining some proximity with James and with some naturalist contemporary theories of the emotions. Peirce's account differs from these in at least three points: first, emotions are not given, but developed and even educated; second, emotions are mainly social; third, they have a cognitive value, as shown in semiotics. With these three features, one can use Peirce in order to give a theory of the emotions as adequate responses to the world, and to rehabilitate some ancient conceptions of rationality as immanent and natural.

 

Law, Truth and Practical Effects: A Pragmatic Analysis of Juridical Realism

FEITOSA, Enoque
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) - Brasil
enoque.feitosa@uol.com.br

Abstract: The purpose of this communication is to analyze some aspects of Juridical Realism - through one of its mentors, Oliver W. Holmes Jr. - by the lens of pragmatic methodology. The point of view used at this paper is the peircean idea about the concept of truth. Focusing the legal phenomena over the activities of Judges and Courts, this legal branch of thinking is established in the same peicean field, as it links the any ideas - truth, justice, good - through the examination of its practical consequences. Peirce describes the methodological steps to be followed for the pragmatic philosophy in the formation of the concepts. These are established in the experience because if we don't have the introspection, all our interior knowledge can only derive from the comment of the exterior world. The Juridical Realism's thesis understand that Judges, even without conscience, construct their judgments - especially over the hard cases - in a two fold process, whereas the conclusion is constructed over what is closer to his own concept of justice and the technical structure, the legal arguments or "ratio deciendi", is only incorporated afterwards. Even so, according to the legal disposition, they should be established at the beginning of the adjudication. The Jurisprudence bounded to the positive formalism, couldn't provide a justification model of the juridical phenomenon. The historic fortuity shows that Judges and philosophers to live in a time and in a society firmly attached to experience and with a strong anti-metaphysical line thought (even so, with some irony, they call themselves as 'metaphysic club') provide the philosophical pragmatism tools to the Juridical realism, subject still with a small field of study in Brazil. Finally, pragmatism could be understood by the way to think that all theories, values, morality, only have instrumental veracity to aim the individuals or society goals. The Juridical Realism debate about legal reasons only has sense if be considerate by point of view utility of phenomenon of social regulation. The Holmes' idea that the basis of Law isn't logic but experience has a main merit of considers the historical and social influences that can't be unknown. To work the hypothesis that Holmes' concept of experience is near to pragmatic idea of experience and the possibility to extend pragmatism view to understand the Legal realism is intent of this paper.

Keywords: Pragmatism. Law. Juridical Realism.

 

Concerning the Pragmatic Vocation of the American Juridical Realism from Benjamin Cardozo's Ideas on Nature of the Juridical Process

FREITAS, Lorena
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE) - Brasil
lorenamfreitas@hotmail.com

Abstract: The aim of this communication is inserted in a common field between Philosophy and Law. The purpose is to identify the bases of the American Juridical Realism in its joints with the pragmatic philosophy. The pragmatism has its origins in 19th century with the "Metaphysical Club of Boston". As a philosophy of action estimates an innovative methodological boarding for breaching the classic logical-Metaphysical approaches. Charles Sanders Peirce, between others, worked this question when writes the paper How to make our ideas clear. However, who gives a famous definition of pragmatism is William James; according to James, pragmatism is a new method to treat old ideas. Our paper takes the juridical phenomenon through Cardozo's ideas as subject to be worked by his book The nature of the judicial process. Benjamin Nathan Cardozo was judge of the Supreme American Court, after Oliver Wendel Holmes Jr, and thus he was an interpreter and, mainly, an applicator of the pragmatic philosophy in the performance of judicial activity. About justification, it is observed that it has a sequence and consequence between the great pragmatists, Peirce gives a new connotation to the logical problem; James explores the psychological elements, his theory is called "current of conscience"; Holmes, as a juridical pragmatist, removes the law of the sphere logical-metaphysics and show it as reality and experience (historical); Cardozo, finally, is the great articulator of these ideas for trying to demonstrate how they effectively happen in cauldrons of the courts (Cardozo's expression). Then, the aims is to understand the pragmatism method contributions to juridical area, and based our comprehension on James' citation: "a method able to finish metaphysical debates", applied to observe the law. To debate these hypotheses concerning the pragmatic vocation of the American juridical realism from the Benjamin Cardozo's ideas about the nature of the judicial process is, finally, our goal.

Keywords: Pragmatism. William James. Realism. Benjamin Cardozo.

 

Eluding the Demon - How Extreme Physical Information Applies to Semeiosis and Communication

FRIEDEN, B. Roy ; ROMANINI, Vinicius
University of Arizona ; University of São Paulo
roy.frieden@optics.arizona.edu
viniroma@gmail.com

Abstract: C.S. Peirce states that a sign represents only some aspect of an object, which means that no representation can be perfect. The form - or information - grounding the sign's ability to represent its object is always deficient in some measure. If we take the difference between the form of the object and the form represented in the sign to be a physical one, the flow of semeiosis can be taken as a flow of information, and consequently, a knowledge game by which the interpretant tries to improve the information grounding the sign, amplifying its ability to represent. The other player in the game, the dynamical object, takes the role of a demon, always changing its form to escape a complete symbolic interpretation. The Extreme Physical Information (EPI) theory, formulated by the American physicist Roy Frieden in 1998, shows how the pay off of this game is always on the side of the interpretant. This explains why semeiosis is teleologic and naturally tends towards an increase of information and knowledge in a community of interpretants pragmatically engaged in the inquiry by means of communication. It also explains why intelligence can evolve among living creatures - their observations tend to be accurate, and accuracy is a prerequisite for effective behaviour. It results that their fitnesses go up, so that evolution favors their existence.

Keywords: Semeiosis. Extreme Physical Information. Peirce. Fisher. Frieden. Communication.

 

The Role of Analogical-Digital Diagrams in the Projective Process in Design

GHIZZI, Eluiza Bortolotto
Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso do Sul - UFMS, Brasil
ghizzi@nin.ufms.br

Resumo: The object of this text is the iconic-diagrammatic sign, in the way it can be observed in the sketches that are part of the projective process in design. The initial part of this study was published in the text Architecture of Diagrams" - presented at the 8th International Meeting on Pragmatism and published in COGNITIO-STUDIES: Electronic Journal of Philosophy, v3, n2, 2006. In the former text we presented the projective practice in architecture as being conducted by a deductive process that is updated in iconic-diagrammatic signs (drawings), pointing at the general features of this process. Now, we will suggest that such features comprise the projective processes in design in general (architectural, graphic, of the object) and, to subsidize the argumentation, we turned to studies of authors who analyze the methodology of project in design. In addition, we introduce reflections on that participation of digital drawings in these processes. As theoretical and methodological references, we use Peircean semiotics, especially "Speculative Grammar" and "Critical Logic". As a result, we point out the deepening of the idea that the diagrammatic process is the way through which both the concept associated with the project and its specific form are defined. Still, it influences a predominantly experimental practice, beneficial to the innovative character aimed at in the projective processes in design. We also conclude that the introduction of mediation by digital diagrams in these processes may amplify or restrict - by taking the mediation by analogical drawings (freehand) as reference - this innovative potential according to the use of the resources made in the digital environment.

Palavras-chave: Iconic-diagrammatic sign. Deductive argumentation. Analogical drawing. Digital drawing.

 

Contemplation in Peirce and in Schopenhauer

GUIMARÃES, Daniel de Vasconcelos; SANTOS, Adriana M. Gurgel
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo - PUC/SP - Brasil
daniel_area26@hotmail.com;
seres003@gmail.com

Abstract: This essay proposes an investigation about the possibility of an approximation between the philosophies of Charles Sanders Peirce and Arthur Schopenhauer, which starts from the study of the inner experience of Peirce's Firstness (the sudden contemplation of the object by the observer) and the knowledge of the Idea (the contemplation of the object by the pure character of knowledge, and not by the individual) of Schopenhauer's. We still intend to highlight, according with a supposed and unpublished Peircean Aesthetics, and agreeing with Schopenhauer Metaphysics of the Beauty, the relation between Art and the experience of contemplation. In order to stabilish a relation between the philosophies of the both authors, it's still interesting to mention, that the comprehension of their methods, and even though their exposition methods does not looks like incompatible with each other. It will be taken as reference, to complete the mentioned objectives, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce and the Schopenhauer's Masterpiece, The Word as Will and Representation. For Peirce, in the act of contemplate a pure quality of feeling, or for Schopenhauer, in the act of the contemplation of the Idea (understood here as the eternal form, the sudden objetivation of the Will, as exposed at the Book III of The World), occurs the lost of the unit of the individual, or rather, the overcoming of the itself as an individual, on a experience where the flux of time is in the present hiatus that it happens. According to Peirce, the phenomenological contemplation constitutes itself as an experience of unity, of pure imediation offered by the quality of feeling; contemplate is to share with the absolute, be unique with the object. In this experience on infinite, of freedom, the world shows itself as in its most profound essence, and the individual founds oneself free of the desire. At Schopenhauer, when the conscience as a hole is fulfilled by the contemplation of the object - even if this object is natural, like a landscape or a tree, or still a building or an art object - there is dissolution of the individual in the very object; the particular thing becomes the idea of its species, and the individual elevates oneself to the pure character of knowledge, both excluded of all forms of the reason principle (the knowledge form of the individuals). When the Idea appears, individual and object aren't distinguished from each other, from the theoretical point of view, according the secondary forms of representation (space, time and causality). There is time suppression the relations disappears, the personality vanishes. So the world as representation appears entirely, and occurs the objetivation as the thing itself, or rather, of the Will, in many different levels. And the Art, the genius' piece of art, is the knowledge mode which repeats the eternal Ideas apprehended by pure contemplation, showing it as plastic art, poetry or music. Art removes the object from its contemplation of the world's path, isolating the object in front of itself. For Peirce, art has a role of retrieving the meaning, a representation of an universe that logic language cannot express in its totality- an universe of freedom, singularity and originality.

Keywords: Peirce. Schopenhauer. Contemplation. Art.

 

Objectivity of Knowledge and Autonomy of the Cultural World

GRIGORIEV, Serge
Temple University
serge@temple.edu

Abstract: In this paper, I employ Peirce's distinction between the anancastic and agapastic modes of evolution to pinpoint what I regard as the strategic tensions in Karl Popper's evolutionary account of objectivity. The distinction between the subjective and the objective knowledge constitutes one of the central themes in Popper's philosophy of science. Popper locates the subjective in the realm of conscious experiences and beliefs; and the objective, in the realm of the cultural products of the human mind, such as theories. Interestingly enough, Popper maintains that the denizens of the latter realm ("world 3," in his idiom) enjoy certain autonomy with regard to the realm of conscious experiences (or "world 2"). In other words, on Popper's view, the content of our theories must be determined by something over and above the explicit content of our discursive practices. This suggestion is all the more intriguing since Popper explicitly denies the possibility of unmediated confrontation between our theories and events in the world of physical things ("world 1"), which serves as our intuitive paradigm of the real. My argument indicates that the interpretation of Popper's account of autonomy and objectivity of the cultural world depends on the way in which he construes the pivotal notion of intersubjectivity, which can be read either along adjusted anancastic or agapastic lines, with the latter being the more promising alternative.

 

Classical Pragmatism and the Law: Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Norms

HERDY, Rachel
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio)
herdy@jur.puc-rio.br

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the investigation about the possibilities that a pragmatist approach opens for the Philosophy of Law. The problem to be addressed specifically is the intercultural challenges to the universality of human rights. Many jurists are frequently disturbed when trying to advance their arguments from the down-to-earth context of an international human rights regime, as displayed by a series of recent and growing treaties and judicial decisions, and engage themselves in an abstract, normative and theoretical justificatory practice of the "belief" in universalizable norms of human rights. Their frustration deepens when one notices incommensurable variations between world legal cultures. In facing this issue, I will start by characterizing what it means to take a pragmatist-based approach to the universality problem in normative theory. I will make reference to a neo-classical version of pragmatism by drawing particularly on the arguments of Susan Haack (on the trail of Charles Sanders Peirce' thought). I will then proceed in the analysis and reflect briefly upon how this classical pragmatist approach accounts for the problem of objectively justifying better-or-worse beliefs considering the norms of Law that are suitable to be universalized. If my argument is successful, it seems to provide human rights theorists and practitioners with a social and legal philosophy that permits the evasion of ethnocentrism and the pursuit of an empirical satisfaction to the problems of universality and normativity in the Philosophy of Law.

Keywords: Pragmatism. Law. Realism. Evolutionary theory. Universalism. Belief. Experience.

 

Qualia and Consciousness: A Peircean Lecture

JORGE, Ana Maria Guimarães
Fundação Armando Alvares Penteado (FAAP-SP). Brasil.
ana.gui@terra.com.br

Abstract: This article intends to think points of qualia and consciousness from contemporary lectures of cognition sciences, and from philosophy of mind, specifically from works of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). This reflection wants to exam different thoughts, dualists and physical, about qualitative faneron as feelings, sensations and emotions in the human mind. This article shows possibility of understand points about mind and matter in the connatural way. So, all consciousness is the possibility of intersection between subjective (inner) and objective faneron.

Keywords: Mind. Quality of feelings. Consciousness. Philosophy of mind.

 

Pragmatism and Communication Systems of a Health Institution: Integrating Conceptions and Practical Consequences

LEÃO, Frederico Camelo
Doutorando em Comunicação e Semiótica, PUC-SP, Brasil
leaofc@gmail.com

Abstract: What are the practical consequences of a religion direction in a health institution? What are the consistencies between the institutional philosophy and its practical applications? How the consequences can be evaluated, both in the internal sphere and the repercussions in community and society? According the pragmatism maxim of Charles Sanders Peirce, the meaning of a concept is the conceivable totality of its practical consequences. The objective of this article is applying the pragmatism of Peirce in the study of the relations between the values code (organizational philosophy) and the consequences of the values application in the practical actions of a health institution. In this sense, the article presents a cartography of the conceptions that ground the FEAL - Fundação Espírita André Luiz communication system. Dedicated to philanthropy, FEAL offers support to 1200 poor mental disabled people and bases its actions on a Spiritism religion direction. The hospital associates orthodox medicine and complementary spiritual therapies. The second part of the article is dedicated to present a study case that demonstrates the consistencies between theory and practice. The conclusion propose a model that points to further directions and developments in other institutions.

Keywords: Pragmatism. Peirce. Communication Systems. Health Institution.

 

Pragmatist Aesthetics and the Reflection on Cyber art

LEÃO, Lucia
Centro Universitário Senac, SENAC, São Paulo, Brasil
lucia@lucialeao.pro.br

Abstract: The objective of this article is to discuss the aesthetic experience of the network actions and to reflect about the politics dimensions of the projects that inhabit cyberspace and permeate the practices on cyberculture quotidian. The idea is to apply the pragmatist aesthetics as it was proposed by John Dewey (Art as experience, 1934) and Richard Shusterman (Pragmatist aesthetics, 1992). New kinds of interaction became possible with the insertion of digital technologies and telematic networks into the everyday practices. Questions like data production, distribution and access are combined with the emergence of collaborative practices, digital communities; in addiction, concepts like authorship, work of art, time and place are in crises. Cyberart includes the poetic investigations that question and/or subvert new media technologies. In this broad category there are projects on networks, augmented reality, virtual reality, as pieces that operate in cybrid spaces, composed by the convergence of in/off line networks. Cyberart projects cannot properly be studied by analytic aesthetics since the concept of art work is not strictly accurate. In this sense, in order to understand the complexities of Cyberart it is necessary to propose some theoretical reformulations. The application of the pragmatist aesthetics program is justified by the fact that it offers a non-dualist vision, and, at same time, emphasizes the continuity among life, politic actions and creative experimentation.

Keywords: Pragmatism. Aesthetics. Networks. Cyberculture. Cyberart.

 

Inertia and Dynamics on Science: Notes About Falsibility and Truth in Scientific Theories

LINS, Alessandra Macedo
Faculdade Maurício de Nassau - FMN - BRASIL
alemacedolins@yahoo.com.br

Abstract: This work intends to compare Karl Popper's and Charles S. Pence's epistemologies. It analyses epistemological issues to light up some fundamental questions such as truth and belief, which are in the basis of their theories.
It might seem ingenuous that knowledge which excludes the subject from the relation and attaches itself to the notion of knowledge as reflecting reality. That assumes an unceasing search for truth in itself. And this truth wouldn't be surpassed.
The idea that we should start from a unique reason came from Cartesians. However, it is a mistake to led into thinking in this restricted way, wondering that the ultimate reason of knowledge is supported in pure rationality or in objective reality.
The falsiability idea, considering the mistake as a scientific possibility, brake the undeniable validity of obtained knowledge paradigm. This work tries to study the two philosophers responsible for scientific theories refutability idea - Peirce and Popper - and, in conclusion, tries to sketch some points concerning the theory of complex knowledge.
As Morin says, "knowledge has a lot of sources and is born from its confluence, in the recurrent dynamism of a ring. Within this ring, subject and object rise together, related to spirit and world, one inside the other, in a dialogical complementing production of each point of the ring".
At first, it's necessary to admit that Popper doesn't recognize any point of intersection between his theory and the Peirce's pragmatism. However, by looking through their works, it's possible to find similarities, and that is the impulse of this work.
The Cartesian classic scientific conception - wrangled by this work - seems to cause a kind of myopia. It is so engaged with order and knowledge, that can not see the novelty. And if radical, it becomes determinist, or a real scatologist . Always looking to the past to see the future, it blocks the complex knowledge, hiding the impossibility to learn about the wholeness in a truly perspective.
Our discussion will try to disclosure this limited condition of knowledge, that comes from our remaining necessity of possessing and controlling. Moreover, recognizing the fallible and limited condition of subject within the knowledge relation is what we're searching for.

Keywords: Science. Cartesianism. Falsiability. Truth. Refutability.

 

William James' "The Variety of Religious Experience" Revisited

LOUCEIRO, Luís Malta
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo - Brasil
louceiro@uol.com.br

Abstract: In 1901 William James (1842-1910) was invited to give the renowned Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh, Scotland, where he lectured on "The Varieties of Religious Experience," published by The Modern Library (NY) in 1902. We will concentrate, here, especially on Lectures XVI and XVII, wherein he approaches "Mysticism" - and introduce Indian classical Yoga, as it was codified by Patañjali in II century BCE, as a Science that leads to the Unitive or Integrated Experience - and Lecture XVIII, which deals with "Philosophy." This is important, I suppose, once Schelling (1775-1854) -, who influenced both Emerson (1803-82) and Peirce (1839-1914) -, faced with the impasse bequeathed by Leibniz (1646-1716), Spinoza (1632-1677) and Kant (1724-1804), appealed, precisely, to the Pantheism of the Upanishads (VIII century B.C.), of Fichte (1762-1814), Eckhart (c.1260-c.1328) and Böhme (1575-1624) to give a new course to Western Philosophy.

Keywords: Pantheism. Schelling. Emerson. Peirce. James. Mysticism.

 

On Peirce's Analysis of Argument from Analogy: the Preliminaries of a Group-Theoretical Account

MC CURDY, William James
Idaho State University-Pocatello, USA
mccuwill@isu.edu

Abstract: Argument from analogy is one of the most important and frequently used forms of reasoning. Immanuel Kant, in notes that were to become his Lectures on Logic, wrote "No logician has yet developed analogy and induction properly. This field still lies open." Later a young American reader of Kant went on to become one the great logicians, in part, by properly developing the logical field of induction as well as that of its chiral inverse, abduction. He also analyzed argument from analogy. Instead of mistakenly classifying it as an odd species of induction or treating it as a stepchild of logic to be relegated to the miscellany section near the back of logic textbooks, C. S. Peirce systematically both relates argument from analogy to, while also distinguishing it from, arguments from deduction, induction, and abduction. This major contribution to both logic and metalogic has been too little noted and still less appreciated even by students of Peirce. This neglect should end and long overdue credit be given to Peirce.
This paper will first explicate Peirce's basic bipartite analysis of argument from analogy, on the one hand, into an abduction and a deduction and on the other hand, into an induction and a deduction. This analysis will then be justified. Next the theory of groups, in particular the concept of group action, will be introduced and then used to exhibit diagrammatically and express algebraically the interplay of the hybrid form of reasoning that is argument from analogy with the forms of deduction, induction, and abduction. Special emphasis will be given the Klein 4-group which plays a major but usually overlooked role in logic. Finally, the paper will end with a further extension of Peirce's analysis to show specifically how argument from analogy is intimately related to Pythagorean analogia, that is, to four-place analogies of the form
A : B :: C : D (A is to B as C is to D) with which it is often associated, but which association has neither been adequately elucidated nor justified.

Keywords: Argument from Analogy. Analogia. Group Theory. Group Action. Klein 4-group.

 

Peirce's Existentialism

MAIN, Robert
Temple University
robmain@temple.edu

Abstract: Recent Peirce scholarship has given rise both to a renewed interest in Peirce's doctrine of fallibilism as well as a greater emphasis on the role played by experience in Peirce's argumentative strategies. This paper unites these two themes by way of an intuition originally advanced by David Savan, who claims that "a semireligious view for which the only appropriate name is existentialist" is central to Peirce's theory of inquiry. This paper adopts Savan's existentialist reading of Peirce in order to analyze the early "anti-Cartesian" papers and Peirce's critique of Cartesian doubt. I argue that while Peirce does indeed object to Descartes' own version of universal doubt, he does not, as has been claimed, reject all forms of universal doubt. Rather, I argue, Peirce reformulates Cartesian skepticism as fallibilism, in a manner that retains the former's status as a condition of inquiry with universal scope and which occupies a central position within Peirce's philosophy. Fallibilism so construed is not merely the doctrine that any one of an individual's beliefs may be wrong, i.e. open to doubt; rather, it is a necessary consequence of the recognition of the finitude of the human self. Peirce thus presents an account that, like traditional existentialist philosophies, is founded on a specific characterization of selfhood in which the defining features of the individual are limitation and finitude. However, he also characterizes truth and even reality as transcendent, separated from the existing individual by an infinite distance. The consequence of this fallibilism, then, is that the governing principle of inquiry becomes, in practice, a paradoxical hope; truth, as the outcome of infinite inquiry, is necessarily unattainable by finite, fallible inquirers, even when they form a (finite) community. This separation between the practice of inquiry and its ideal end has contributed to arguments holding that Peirce's philosophy suffers from a fatal paradox and is largely responsible for the traditionally polarizing characterizations of Peirce with respect to questions of nominalism, realism, idealism and transcendentalism. I offer the suggestion that adopting an "existentialist" reading of fallibilism (in the qualified sense advocated by Savan and which does not ignore or diminish Peirce's pragmaticism) as the central element of Peirce's thought would enable an account that avoids such dilemmas.

 

Pragmatic Considerations of the Information Concept

MIRANDA, João Gabriel Jeziorny
Universidade Estadual Paulista - UNESP - Campus Marília - Brasil
joaojeziorny@marilia.unesp.br

Abstract: The information concept has been studied in systematic way mainly for researchers of the areas of Cognitive Science, Mathematics, Physics and Biology. The objective pursued for such researchers is to know in way more efficient as to manipulate, to store, to spread, to reproduce and to interact with the informative data, being its a central concerns the measure´s concept, amount of information generated for a source, the capacity of transmission of the canal as well as its effectiveness in the transmission of data. In this context, the information has been seen in terms of transmission and reception of messages. As we can notice, the aiming studies of information is basically technical therefore to escape from its domain questions of epistemological, ontologial and pragmatic nature inherent to the concept of information. We´ll look for in our comunication expliciting the epistemological and ontological character of the information, indicating its possible bond with the knowledge and its subsequent practical unfolding. In this direction, we´ll analyze the philosophy proposal for Charles S. Peirce (1931, 1958) mainly its logic called Semiotics. In the epistemologic perspective we defend the hypothesis that the information is the responsible element for the foundation and justification of beliefs. In the ontological perspective we´ll show that information far from being a substance, an entity or thing, it can be identified as a semiotic process. Pragmatically we conceive the information as that propitiates the attainment, the breaking and the change of beliefs (knowledge) that will guide the action of a situated agent in their environment.

Keywords: Information. Semiotics. Pragmatism.

 

The Role of the Meaning of the Information in the Directionality of the Action: A Pragmatic Reflection

MORAES, João Antonio de; RODRIGUES, Gilberto César Lopes
Universidade Estadual Paulista - UNESP - Campus de Marília - Brasil
moraesunesp@yahoo.com.br
gilbertocesar@gmail.com

Abstract: The objective of this work is to analyze as the semantic aspect of the information participates of the directionality of the action. Such analysis will be supported in two bases: in the pragmatism of Peirce (1958), particularly in his conception of as the meaning semiotics results of the relation; e in the hypothesis of the formation of meanings on the part of the informacionais processes, as formulated for De Tienne (2007). Recently the study of the action it took new direction with the inclusion of the theories of the information. However, this combination little advanced in the agreement of the underlying processes the action because such theories take as base the Mathematical Theory of the Communication (Shannon, 1949), that they do not consider its "semantic character". In contrast, we will argue that the directionality of the action is resulted of the interaction between the organism, inserted in a rich environment of significant information, and the signs that are there. Thus, the intention of this analysis is to evaluate where measured the understanding of the semantic aspect of the information it would allow to advance in the explanation of the directionality of the action.

Keywords: Information. Meaning. Directionality. Action.

 

The Concept of Information in the Context of Peircean Pragmatic Philosophya

MORONI, Juliana
Universidade Estadual Paulista - UNESP - Marília - Brasil
Juliana-moroni@marilia.unesp.br

Abstract: The present text has the purpose of analyzing the three Peircean phenomenological categories concerning to their relation with the concept of information. According to Peirce, all the phenomena that occur in the world can be understood and reduced to the follow triad: firstness, secondness and thirdness. As pointed out in Santaella (2004), through the inter-relation among the categories of this triad, the Peircean phenomenology characterize the mind as inseparable from the matter and intrinsically connected to action. Mind and matter are considered to be a continuum controlled by habits that are established by the category of thirdness. We try to show that such habits, which are universalized and incorporated in the thirdness, they transmit information that will direct the organisms' behavior in the environment where they live. Thus, every way of knowledge is naturalized and, as well as information, it just constitutes itself in meaningful action when it is put in a context. According to Santaella (2004), the Peircean epistemological theory is based on a method of which central point is designated by a process on which a particular belief state (by means of information) is submitted to a doubtful state (also particular) aiming for reaching a new particular belief state, and so on, continually, however, without reaching to the conquest of the absolute truth or knowledge. We argue that Peirce adopts an externalist approach of information, attributing value to the experience, to the habit and to action of the agents placed in the world. Knowledge and information are interconnected and both of them are characterized for functioning as a spiraled cumulative process on which the occurrence of the later stages depends on the previous ones. The information is a dynamic anti-determinist process of which purpose is to anticipate the future, potentially, establishing a conditional for action.

Keywords: Pragmatism. Information. Phenomenology.

 

Pragmatism and the History of Philosophy: A Study of Peirce and Plato

O'HARA, David Lloyd
Augustana College, USA
david.ohara@augie.edu

Abstract: How important is a study of the history of Philosophy to Pragmatism? In this paper I will discuss the importance of the history of Philosophy for Peirce by examining his turn to Plato in his later years. As late as 1894 Peirce wrote that he had read only a little of Plato, and only in English translation; but by the late 1890s Peirce's manuscripts contain over a thousand pages of his writings on Plato. These include numerous commentaries on the dialogues of Plato and partial translations of several the dialogues. In these few years Peirce found that a re-examination Plato's dialogues helped him to articulate the relevance of the great historical community of inquiry and to re-think his own metaphysical system. In this paper I will look at two important consequences of Peirce's study of Plato: first, Plato was instrumental in Peirce's reply to David Hume's argument against miracles. Peirce, reading Plato through the lens of Lutoslawski's stylometry, held that Plato abandoned dyadic metaphysics for triadic metaphysics in his late period. This late-Platonic metaphysics permits laws of nature to grow, effectively answering Hume's argument against miracles as violations of laws of nature. As a second consequence of Peirce's study of Plato, I argue that Peirce's later semiotics are developed in conjunction with Plato's Cratylus, through an examination of Plato's understanding of the relationship of verbal signs to physis, or being.

Keywords: Peirce. Plato. History of Philosophy. Cratylus. Hume. Miracles.

 

Logic of Relatives and Semiotics. On Some Unsuspected Correspondences between Peirce and Structuralism

PAOLUCCI, Claudio Paolucci
University of Bologna - Italy
clapaolucci@tin.it

Abstract: This talk is meant to highlight how the Logic of Relatives by Peirce is without any doubt the foundational text of a structuralist epistemology in semiotics and linguistics. More particularly, the Logic of Relatives constitutes a structural actantial ??? syntax, as it was developed decades later in linguistics by Lucien Tesnière and in narrative semiotics by A. J. Greimas.
The passage from a predicative logic founded on the distinction subject-predicate to a positional logic founded on the verbal valence opens to a new conception of the identity of relative terms and constitutes the foundation of an authentic revolution also in the semiotic conception of Peirce, if compared to its foundation in the anti-Cartesian essays of the 1868.
L'intervento vuole mettere in luce come la Logica dei Relativi di Peirce costituisca in assoluto il testo di fondazione di un'epistemologia strutturalista in semiotica e in linguistica, e più in particolare costituisca una sintassi attanziale strutturale, così com'è stata sviluppata decine di anni dopo in linguistica da Lucien Tesnière e in semiotica narrativa da A. J. Greimas.
Il passaggio da una logica predicativa fondata sulla distinzione soggetto-predicato ad una logica posizionale fondata sulla valenza verbale apre così ad una nuova concezione dell'identità dei termini relativi e costituisce il fondamento di un'autentica rivoluzione anche all'interno della concezione della semiotica peirciana, se comparata alla sua fondazione nei saggi anti-cartesiani del 1968.

 

The Nature of Pragmatism and the Quest for a Hispanic Pragmatist"

PAPPAS, Gregory Fernando
Texas A & M University

Abstract: Are there any Hispanic Pragmatist? In order to answer this question,
I take a stand on the issue of what Pragmatism is. Pragmatism was
revolutionary because it criticized the modern starting point and
instead took "experience" as the proper starting point of any
philosophical investigation. I defend this Pragmatic view by
contrasting it with other common views about pragmatism and by using
the arguments of South American philosopher Risieri Frondizi
concerning why experience should be the starting point of philosophy.
If I am correct about Pragmatism, then Frondizi deserves to be
considered as a Hispanic Pragmatist."

 

Anticipation and Abduction

PESSOA, Kátia Batista Camelo e GIRARDI, Gustavo Melazi
Universidade Estadual Paulista- UNESP - Marília
navevida@yahoo.com.br
gustavogirardi@marília.unesp.br

Abstract: The aim of this work is to analyze the concept of anticipation that, in accordance with De Tienne´s (2005) conception, is a process by means of which the representation of a future state orientates a present semeiotic event and its relation to the abductive reasoning. In such a conception, the anticipation involves a teleological dimension, in the extent that it incorporates signs with the unfolding of its interpretants. In the process of semeiosis, that is to say, in the unfolding of signs, they carry on their own future, for they are laden with intentions, desires, necessities and ideals. We point out that, in the semeiosis, the information is inherently processual, for signs are constituted in a dynamics, and by means of such a dynamics, when they are instantiated, they adopt a conditional form which has the characteristic of enunciating vaguely what may happen in the future. At anticipating an interpretation, semeiosis moves on in two directions in time: first, in the present, the interpretation involves something from the past which, when signalized via intentions, point us to the future; and, second, from the future to the present, when orientating the present events by means of the representation of the future. There is a correlation between these two time directions, in the extent that we can forecast, via semeiotic process, the future happenings, being such a forecast an orientation for the present events. We shall argue in defense of the existence of a fruitful relationship between the process of anticipation and the abductive reasoning, a relation that - when collecting information in the form of an ordered set of propositions of a semeiotic continuum - makes possible the formulation of new hypotheses.

Keywords: Anticipation. Abduction.

 

Truth X Method: A Punctual Analysis of the Constitution of the Rationalist Conception of the Knowledge Theory (A Counterpoint Between Theoretical Models of René Descartes and Charles S. Peirce)

PESSÔA, Fabiano de Melo.
Faculdade Integrada do Recife - FIR - Brasil
fabianompessoa@hotmail.com

Abstract: This communcication intends to analyse, critically, the constitution of the rationalist concepction of the Knowledge theory through a counterpoint between the rationalist model of René Descartes and the pragmatic perspective of Charles S. Peirce. Starting from Descartes' model - which gives a new direction to the path traced by human Knowledge, as it places man as main actor in the cognitive task - we reach to identify what seems to be obscure in his theory. For this purpose, we take into consideration the model presented by Charles Peirce, who playing an interessant and innoveting role in the struggle for developing a rational model of the cognitive process, presents us with a enormous contribution to the achievement of one of the most important knowledge theory's challenges, which is to be able to embrace as most as possbile aspects of all what is to us given to be known. Trying to overcome Descartes' model in which it was obscured, Charles Peirce forumlate his theory about the fixation of belief, with his feet grounded on "reality", in a mainly empiristic perspective, that he nominates as cientific method of fixation of belief. The Peirceian proposol is based in the independecy between thought and reality. For him, in spite of the fact that men are all equipped with the rational attribute, we could not assert that this characteristic itself could be able to work as a parameter to the apprehension of reality. In fact, elements of reality itself should be introduced into the process of conceptualizing truth. Contrastes Peirce the cientific investigation with the Cartesian intuitive-rational method, to which gives the name of the "a priori" method of fixation of belief. After going through the main aspects of the theoretical models presented by Peirce and Descartes, we notice that, in spite of having included elements of what could be called "the structure of reality" into his process of apprehension of knowledge, Peirce still conceives thruth as a result of a method ("methodical fatalism"). For that reason we try to investigate if this could imply, in the Peirceian thought, the exclusion of the possibility that might exist divergent opinions, equally representing truth, of a single object.

Keywords: Knowledge Theory. Rationalism. Pragmatism. Descartes. Peirce.

 

Abduction as Fundamental Inference in the Production of Knowledge

PETRY, Luís Carlos e PETRY, Arlete dos Santos
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo/ PUCSP - São Paulo/Brasil
petry@pucsp.br
rletepetry@gmail.com

Abstract: This work starts on one of the aspects of the peircean critics to the cartesianism. It talks specially about the critical revision of the intuition concept, putting it inside the science method's studies, one of the central questions on Peirce's work. As a result to the critical on cartesianism's spirit, he keeps track of a reflection over the abduction concept, which is purposed by Peirce as the first step to his research method. It situates the importance of the abduction on the research process and stabilishes some approach possibilities with other thinkers (specially the philosophers of hermeneutic phenomenology and Lacanian based psychoanalysts). The investigation process developed over the text present itself based on a work methodology that works for the cooperative dialog between Peirce's and Heidegger's phenomenology, identifying mainly the aspects and moments where the second was deeply influenced by the first's thoughts on his purpose of a practical world philosophy, coming from the Being and Time. Backwardly, the after-developments on German hermeneutic phenomenology, have helped us to understand in a deeper and more carefully the pragmatic philosopher's purposes.
Working over this perspective, we are taking the first methodological step on our researches, which endings are keeping alive the Peircean purpose on a research method that talks about not leaving the creative power in the middle of the thinking and producing. Totally differently, with the abduction concept, art and science meet themselves for the scientific knowledge production, for poetry, like showed in the artistic perspectives of these new technologies.
This way, starting with the fact that the Peircean research method takes as basis an opening concept on Philosophy's history, which is, the concept of the thought as a sign and that the sign, in Peirce's concept, is the materialization of the thought, we find converging points where with other newer abordations, which look like coming, for a comparisional ending, where the concept of centered method and reflection in questions is the central point.
In this research, we worked in the way for an approach that wants to value the history of the western thought which is the argumentative dialog, which has as the central point the questions that determinate us, as in the present, the central concept of abduction as an answer to the problem of intuition.

Keywords: Abduction. Intuition. Semiotic. Method. Knowledge Theory. Phenomenology.

 

On the Place of Logic in Pragmatism

PIETARINEN, Ahti-Veikko
University of Helsinki
ahti-veikko.pietarinen@helsinki.fi

Abstract: From the point of view of contemporary logic, early attacks on formal logic by some of the pragmatist philosophers such as F. S. C. Schiller are little more than archaic aspirations to the priority ordinary language should have in philosophy. On the other hand, though agreeing with Schiller that philosophy, as far as it analyses "vague ideas of ordinary life" should indeed use "a body of words with vague significance" (MS 280, 1905), Charles Peirce thought that philosophy should nevertheless clothe itself in a vocabulary of its own. Peirce conceived the abundance of novel notions of logics not in order to have a rich toolkit at hand for a variety of technical purposes but in order to have the means by which the meanings of the expressions with vague significations can be made precise. Logic thus does not concern primarily with the questions of analysing the usage of language but with the nature of ideas. It has to take precedence over metaphysics lest the speculation flow free in the boundless realm of philosophical thought. While William James appreciated Peirce's arguments against Schiller to a degree, I will go on arguing that the neglect of logical roots of pragmatism (pragmaticism) in contemporary debates can be viewed as instances of the symptom of viewing language as a universal medium of expression.

 

An "Onion without a Peel": Transparency and Embodiment in the Light of Peirce's Semeiotic

REDONDO, Ignacio
University of Navarra (Department of Communication)
nredondo82@gmail.com

Abstract: It is a common-place now that Peirce's triadism attempts to escape from the pitfalls of both idealism and materialism. Especially, the doctrine of synechism, with its seeking for continuities in every realm of experience, is supposed to be the philosophical keystone that allows this triumph over dualisms of all sorts. Nevertheless, there are several passages from Peirce that seem to defeat a clear-cut interpretation on this matter. In particular, the idea that the sign is a medium that conveys forms or features from an object appears to be a non-pragmatistic concession to some kind of Platonism, in which pure ideas have to be poured from its "vessel" (CP 3.597). Indeed, as several scholars have shown, Peirce's communicative definition of the sign has to deal with a problematic tension between an ideal of transparency and the need for embodiment. In this paper, some of these problems and difficulties will be taken into account from the point of view of Peirce's synechistic philosophy of representation. Throughout a careful development of the basic claim that "all thought is in signs", it will be shown that while it is not possible to reduce the sign to any of its particular instantiations, it requires some kind of embodiment in order to complete its semiotic function. In addition, an analysis of the three types of mediation taking place in every genuine triadic relation will show that it is not correct to hold causal or idealistic explanations in semiosis. On the contrary, it will be defended that the pervading, continuous flow of mediation in experience allows Peirce to surmount materialism and idealism into a sophisticated form of semiotic realism that effectively articulates thought and expression without diminishing the role played by any of its components.Taking into consideration some consequences that can be drawn from this picture, the paper concludes with some suggestions for a more robust philosophy of communication, in which there is no place for immaterial contact or ethereal fusion of unembodied minds.

Keywords: Semiotic Transparency. Embodiment. Synechism. Realism. Mediation.

 

A Pragmaticist Answer to he Question of Causal Exclusion in the Philosophy of Mind

RIBEIRO, Henrique de Morais
UNESP- Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências - Marília, Brasil.
hdemoraisribeiro@yahoo.co.uk

Abstract: The contemporary philosophy of mind, in what refers to the field of mental realism, faces the question of the causal exclusion of mind. In accordance with some arguments put forward in the literature, the mind seems to be causally excluded from the physical universe. Such a question of exclusion is due to two presuppositions assumed by physicalists. One presupposition is the causal closure of the physical, according to which the causal chains are closed, that is, for every physical cause there must be a physical effect; the other presupposition is the non-overdetermination, according to which there must be one and only one physical cause for every physical effect. This work concerns with the pragmaticist critique of presuppositions described by considering Peirce´s assumption of final cause, which necessary includes the mind amid the physical, and so avoids the question of exclusion.

Keywords: Mental realism. Causal exclusion. Physicalism. Final cause.

 

Peirce and Schopenhauer: Relation Between Firtness and Idea

RODRIGUES JUNIOR, Ruy de Carvalho; SANTOS, Adriana M. Gurgel
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo - PUC/SP - Brasil
ruydec@uol.com.br
seres003@gmail.com

Abstract: The goal of this project is to study similarities and differences between the attempt to determine the fundaments of the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of culture in Arthur Schopenhauer and a phenomenological-categorical conception of firstness in C. S. Peirce. This study is based on the fundamental reformulation of Schopenhauer's theory of representation (already perceivable in 1829, in some non published fragments), on his important work of 1836 (On The Will In Nature, in which the author wants to find a possible confirmation of his metaphysical theories in the sciences of his time), on the second edition of The World As Will And Representation (1844), and on its Complements (1851). This study states that in the core of the shift in sense of Schopenhauer's theory of representation is the troublesome concept of matter (Materie and Stoff) and the difficult concept of substance, concepts that will force the Frankfurt philosopher to make at least three great attempts to justify his metaphysics of nature and his metaphysics of culture. Based on the above mentioned attempts made by Schopenhauer throughout his vast work, this study intends to discuss the possibility of establishing a connection/similarity between Peirce's phenomenological category of Firstness and the concepts of Idea interwoven in the second and fourth books of Schopenhauer's masterpiece, The World As Will And Representation. The reasons that justify this similarity/connection are based on the tense relationship between Schopenhauer's subjective and transcendental idealism and Aristotle's and Suarez's realism, on one side, and Peirce's original articulation between the realism of aristotelean and scotus influence and the idealism based on Schelling and Neoplatonicism, on the other side.

Keywords: Peirce. Schopenhauer. Phenomenology. Metaphysics.

 

Contributions of Pragmatism to the Concept of Cognition in Contemporary Epistemology

RODRIGUES, Luciane
Universidade Estadual Paulista - UNESP/Marília - Brasil
lucirodrigues@marilia.unesp.br

Abstract: The aim of the present work is to indicate possible contributions of Charles S. Peirce Pragmatism to the understanding of the concept of cognition, in the context of contemporary epistemology. We will argue that Peircean Evolutionary Realism, in respect to his hypotheses on the nature of habit formation processes, of meaningful action, and of diagrammatic constructions, contributes significantly to the understanding of knowledge acquisition, which is the main object of Ecological Philosophy. Special emphasis will be given to the relevance of Peircean fallibilist method to the elucidation of the process of hypotheses generation. In this context, we will analyze the epistemological groundings of Ecological Philosophy, according to which cognition is directly linked to the cognitive subject's perception and action in his/her evolutionary interactions with the environment. We will focus on the Peircean hipothesis about the principle of habits generation that constitutes meaningful action. We understand that meaningful action is possible only because there is a continuity between evolutionary and cultural histories, constitutive of the subject's habits of actions. In the Peircean sense, continuity indicates the possibility of meaning that is contained objectively in the world, i.e. "objective conditions that function as rules that determinate consequences" (Hausman 1993, p. 73). We will also argue that meaning results from the interaction between historical and environmental dynamics in which organisms exist, given that this interaction is pregnant of objective factors (immediate objects) that restrict the domain of interpretation and action of organisms in the world. Finally, we will discuss two implications of this approach: (i) historical reality contributes for the understanding of the objective aspect of cognition / perception, however, (ii) this history indicates the organism's semiotic universe.

Keywords: Evolutionary realism. Pragmatism. Immediate object. Historical subject. Meaningful action.

 

A Prudência Aristotélica e sua Aplicação na Medicina

ROMANELLO, Geraldo
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo - PUC/SP
gromanello@terra.com.br

Resumo: A interpretação aristotélica das virtudes está dentro da tradição clássica, até hoje não desprezada, o que revela um real valor e decididamente sua participação na tradição clássica como prática do pensamento moral. Seu domínio se confirma há mais de dois mil e trezentos anos, mantendo a tradição racional, em uma visão realista, sem pessimismo, aberta ao mundo social e científico.
Os seres humanos possuem uma natureza específica caracterizada pelo seu pendor ao bem. Este é o pressuposto de Aristóteles: a natureza humana mantém-se a mesma no tempo e o espaço, apesar de haver modificações sociais, culturais, religiosas, econômicas, tecnológicas e científicas.
O bem particular é o bem dos homens, sintetizado na atividade virtuosa; é a eudaimonia, traduzido por felicidade, bem-aventurança, ou ainda, prosperidade. A felicidade é uma das questões abertas em Aristóteles. Quanto ao bem do homem, pode ser definido como um estar bem e fazer o bem.
O exercício das virtudes aparece como a parte central da vida. O sistema ético de Aristóteles tem seu sentido neste exercício das virtudes, o qual traz com resultado imediato à eleição de uma boa ação.
Na pessoa naturalmente boa o hábito também deve ser desenvolvido. Este detalhe na ética aristotélica revela a necessidade da educação moral para todos os homens, bem como a preponderância do racional sobre o sentimental. O papel da razão é de justamente conter os apetites, orientando-os de modo correto, indicando uma decisão racional, inibindo ou até mesmo vencendo os desejos distintos do bem.
Os meios para atingir um fim pedem juízo. Para isto, entram em ação as virtudes, como capacidade de julgar, opinar (porque, no particular, há a opinião correta como o verdadeiro), atingindo a ação correta, o fazer correto, no lugar correto, no momento correto e da forma correta. Esta faculdade opinante ou deliberativa não pode ser confundida como uma aplicação rotineira de normas. Aristóteles não formula normas de agir, ou imperativos. A noção de dever fica de modo implícito na sua ética, embora o termo dever lá conste.
Novamente aparece a relação entre a sabedoria prática e as virtudes morais: os juízos obtidos através de um raciocínio prático, incluem julgamentos sobre o que é bom, correto de fazer. Em suma, uma pessoa, ao agir, guia-se por tais juízos, os quais dependem das virtudes ou dos vícios, quer intelectual ou morais. Como resultado, a ação mesma revela o caráter da pessoa.
A phronesis aplicada na Medicina visa diminuir as incertezas a um mínimo para que o médico possa tomar uma decisão prudente. A deliberação médica estaria baseada na clínica e na ética.

Palavras-chave: Aristóteles. Medicina. Ética.

 

Esthetic Complexity in Art Recorded in a Triadic Proforma: Contributions Towards Pragmatism's Proof

RYAN, Paul Jonathan
University of the Arts London, UK
p.ryan3@wimbledon.arts.ac.uk

Abstract: For Peirce, esthetics was the normative science considering 'those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling', which shade into perceptual judgements. As Hookway has highlighted (Cognitio Vol 6,1 p40), one feature in any proof of Pragmatism would be that esthetic experience is shown to be complex, or meaning-rich (rather than random or simple which would seem to tend towards supporting nominalism or idealism respectively). The application of the Pragmatic maxim could then clarify that complexity in an interdependent way rather than in a circularity. It is worth noting that Peirce claimed that he was 'a perfect ignoramus in esthetics' (EP 2 p189).
Using an artist's sketch as the object for analysis this paper will will map out some of the esthetic complexity Peirce's semeiotic theory already illuminates. It will become clear that even with a relatively simple drawing, 'meanings' concerning many objects are held in one art-object (e.g. the representation, the material, the artist, the genre, the style, the colours and so on). I will list 25 objects as a start. Similarly, 'I' as interpreter contribute multiple 'interpretants' and again I will stop my list at 25 (e.g. Artist, Adult, Child, Englishman, Semeiotician…).
Although the chosen object is an 'artwork', I am not using the word esthetics to mean 'the philosophy of fine art'. However an artwork's esthetic can be appreciated within that part of nature peculiar to humankind and only addressed to the visual sense. One question to be considered is whether this gives more or less complexity to the esthetics of a 'work of art' than to a non-human made object e.g. a shell or a tree.
Building on the semeiotic nonogram I am developing a 'triadic proforma' for recording perceptions which I will present as a work in progress. (Perceptions being esthetic sensations which have been judged, or to which assent has been given or withheld, and are therefore propositional).
A three sided volume, a frustum, will be shown as a model to visualise the size/realizability of any investigation into the esthetics of an object. Although the volume of the solid represents a continuum of meaning, the volume may represent the limits of that continuum in any enquiry. The frustum may be squeezed down to a line for any hypothetical final truth for a community of enquirers.
For Pragmatism to have its proof, the complexity of esthetics must be so far beyond demonstration (indemonstrable) that we must be confident enough to assume it to be as much the case as the argument form: 'If A then B; but A: therefore B.' Such confidence can only be found if all enquiries into esthetics reveal complexity upon scrutiny. The history of disagreements over esthetics would seem to confirm this already, but that isn't what that history sets out to do. This paper aims to go some way to point out how Peirce begins to provide the methodology to analyse esthetic experience (reversing generalisations), even though he left that work to be done.

Keywords: Peirce. Esthetics. Perception. Proof of Pragmatism. Drawing. Art.

 

Cinema and Pragmatism: A Reflection on Creative Genesis in the Cinematographic Art

SANTOS, Marcelo Moreira
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo - PUC-SP
marcelo_m.s@terra.com.br

Abstract: This article aims to discuss the importance and urgency of Peirce's philosophy to understand the creative genesis of movie-making. This is a reflection on the ontology and a possible cinematographic epistemology through Peircean Semiotics. Methodologically, we discuss the Phenomenology of the Metropolis as a fulcrum for the development of a Language and of an Aesthetics such as the aesthetic dimension possible to be achieved within the language of cinema, by observing the hybrid character of such communication and the behavior of the movie makers in relation to those particular possibilities of aesthetics, and by emphasizing the importance of Pragmatism in the materialization of a movie through a triadic thought, from the imaginary ideality at first, the trying out of possibilities as a second stage, towards a definition of the idea, to the externalization and development of a movie as language. This triad has the Peircean Categories - Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness - as its conceptual ground, and yet keeps many correspondences with the Poetics of Aristotle, allowing, thus, a reflection between Peirce and the great Greek philosopher.

Keywords: Semiotics. Pragmatism. Cinema. Ontology. Epistemology. Phenomenology.

 

Can an Ultimate Foundation of Knowledge be Non-Transcendental?

SILVA, Josué Cândido da
Universidade Estadual de Santa Cruz - UESC - Brasil
josuecandido@uol.com.br

Abstract: The title of our paper is a reference to the proposal of Kart-Otto Apel of a non-metaphysical foundation of the philosophy starting from ideal community of communication concept. In its foundation, Apel leaves of the conditions beyond we cannot go (nichthitergehbaren) of the speech situation, whose denial would take the unavoidably performative self-contradiction. That is to say, even a skeptic needs to argue about the reasons for which it refuses the opponent's argument. When arguing, however, it would be already the skeptic in a speech situation and, therefore, accepting the rules that govern the argumentative speech. The only alternative to that situation that would remain the skeptic would be to stay in silence, but, in that case, he could not give to know its point of view and either it would be characterized as skeptical. Starting from the rules that govern the daily speech, Apel derives ideal community of communication concept presupposed a priori as condition of all real situation of communication. Such concept would allow it the establishment of the transcendental conditions of foundation of the philosophy capable to overcome the post-modern relativism that postulates the impossibility of any foundation of the philosophy. On the other hand, the passage of the argumentative situation of a real community of speech to the ideal community of communication concept, as whole speaker's transcendental presupposition, seems not to be sufficiently justified. Already in Aristotle, the indirect proof (elenchos) he just presupposes a real situation of speech in that at least a speaker that wants to refute the argument. For Apel, the presupposition of a real situation of speech is not satisfactory for its project of foundation of the philosophy, of there the resource to an ideal community inner of the real community of communication. That resource brings, even so, a series of difficulties due to the relationship among ideal and real community of communication. To consider the way abandoned by Apel of a non-transcendental and pragmatic foundation of the philosophy is the theme of the present paper.

Keywords: Foundation. Transcendental pragmatic. Karl-Otto Apel.

 

Do our best methods for fixing belief lead to a unique opinion about truth?

SMITH, Barry
University of London
b.smith@bbk.ac.uk

Abstract: In 'The Fixation of Belief', Peirce observes that opinions settled by the methods of tenacity and authority can be disrupted by observing that other people or other societies, can hold different opinions about the truth or falsity of a given proposition. However, he suggests, by contrast, that our best methods of inquiry are likely to lead to a unique and agreed opinion about the truth of any properly formulated hypothesis. His reasons are that each proposition is either true or false, and that the methods of reasoning and investigation used to settle truth (or opinion) about these matters will secure common assent. However, the possibility remains that different parties to a dispute may both adhere to widespread principles of reasoning, both conform to the standards of their chosen logic and yet arrive at divergent opinions about a particular issue. It may be the case that each party to the dispute is epistemically faultless in their reasoning even though they arrive at different opinions, and that, in some sense, they are both right. In this paper I explore the coherence of a relativist view that the same proposition may be true for one set of reasoners and false for another, and I examine whether there is anything in Peirce's system to rule out such a possibility.

 

Elements from Peirce in Habermas' and Apel's Debate

ZANETTE, José Luiz
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo - PUCSP
Zanetti@gvo.com.br ou zanetti@keynet.com.br

Abstract: Habermas and Apel, influenced by the American pragmatism, developed the Ethics of the Discourse. However, Apel and Habermas diverged acutely about the possibility of an ultimate grounding for that ethic.
For Apel, in Peirce, there is a validity foundation project of the "synthetic inferences" (abduction and the induction), which take place as a way of transcendental logic, and they are simultaneously, an interpretation logic of the signs. To this transcendental semiotics, a normative theory of procedures is combined for the possible criteria in the creation of a consensual theory of the truth. With such base, for Apel, the language is the transcendent condition of all sense and validity, since it is implicitly pragmatic in the link of the speech to its own success, with the need of consensus about the understanding of the signs, following the interpretation about the world objects, with their understanding or misunderstanding. The argumentative thought equals a validity pretension that has to avoid the performing self-contradiction. It is "a priori" logic applicable to the communication community and that grounds an ethical procedural system.
Habermas sees the apriorism of Apel as a type of return to the conscious philosophy. Unlike Apel, for Habermas, the pragmatic approach of Peirce is a reconciliation promise between Kant and Darwin, with a transcendental one and evolutionism both compatible to their nature studies of Schelling and the reception of the Marxist práxis.
Habermas disregards the possibility of arguments which are exempt from empiric test and, even in an universal pragmatic in which the just is characterized by the impartial criterion of constitution of its procedural system, there is no way to guarantee that a moral norm cannot be altered hereafter, since it would request, to guarantee for this future, the same conditions of world of life of the moment of its constitution. It is an anti-skeptic falibilism with a moral constructivism, founded on a continuous process of learning, which contemplates the chance and the evolutionism.
Habermas refutes the "a priori" logic of the communication community, believing that the rational acceptability is made possible "a posteriori", by using a transcendental power of the linguistic structure founded on communication forms by which we understood each other about the world events and about ourselves. It happens as such, because the language is not a private property, and nobody disposes, exclusively, of a common mean of understanding, which requests intersubjective sharing. Even if falibilist, in the "logos" of the language, the power of the intersubjetive is personified, that is previous to the speakers' subjectivity and it sustains it.
In the evolutionism, without intending to deny the evolution of the species, Habermas does not accept a previous theory that, to each experience, leads to a necessary compatibility with the latter. Disregarding the ideal justificability and, with the truth concepts as rational acceptability, the anti-skeptic falibilism with a continuum learning and arguments validated by the condition impartiality of its constitution, the "a posteriori" of Habermas refutes Apel, but brings him closer to Peirce.

Keywords: Pragmatism. Transcendental Logic. Apel. Habermas. Peirce.