November 8th to 11th, 2004

Gabriel José Corrêa Mograbi
gjcmograbi@hotmail.com
UFRJ - Brazil

WAWING GOODBYE TO JAEGON KIM

ABSTRACT
Through the 1940´s and 1950´s a pragmatist view of mind was elaborated by Wittgenstein and Ryle. Both writers, each for different reasons, would have considered Jaegon Kim´s robust phisicalism as a piece of philosophical non-sense. On the other hand, pragmatist accounts of the mind are not easily tolerated by robust physicalism. Current debates over the mind-body problem are totally closed to any pragmatist influence.
My aim in this paper is to illuminate Kim´s reductionist turn in the mind-body debate, and then to assess it inspired by some of Wittgenstein´s ideas. I will argue against Kim, that Wittgenstein´s notion of Certainty and its consequences cannot be put aside. Furthermore, I will focus my criticism against Kim, considering the relation between action and intention. I will show that some of our beliefs must have a causal relevance and not just an explanatory role. My presentation of evidence for this claim will not be based only upon philosophical arguments, but also in some thesis of Brain Science and other fields of knowledge. My final conclusion will be that the very metaphysical ontology that is purposed by Kim is not sophisticated enough to describe the variety of mental events entangled in the most simple intentional human act.

KEYWORDS: Pragmatism, Fisicalism, Mind, Intention.

Center for Pragmatism Studies
Philosophy Graduate Program
Departament of Philosophy
Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo - Brazil