November 8th to 11th, 2004

José Francisco dos Santos
Zezinho@unifebe.edu.br
Unifebe - Brazil

THE CONSENSUS OF THE COMMUNITY OF INVESTIGATORS AND REAL THIRDNESS IN PEIRCE

ABSTRACT
On Peirce's philosophy, truth coincides with the final opinion that a community of inquirers possibly would arrive at, if the inquiry would be extended indefinitely. This claim indicates the fallibility of our conclusions about matters of fact, in any determined time. This fallibility is caused, by one hand, by the limits of our inquiries and, by the other hand, by the uncertain character of the object itself. This uncertainty is due to the action of Chance, like an inhering element of things, corresponding to firstness. The character of generality, that allows our comprehension of the universe, is due to the formation of habits of action, resulted from the recurrence of the events. This is thirdness. On Peirce, thirdness doesn't correspond only to a category of thought, but represents the behavior of things themselves. Generality, so, is real, and to represent it is the aim of science. Our theories are true if they adequately represent this behavior. Inquiry, if pursued by an undetermined time, and by a community of inquirers, will converge to a perfect description of reality, because inquiry itself is self-corrective, and the error will tend to be corrected. If the idea of the agreement of a community of inquirers is taken without ontologic considerations, the theory looses its realist character, becoming relativistic. This deflection of interpretation frequently happens.

KEYWORDS: Real Thirdness, Community of Inquirers, Realism, Truth.

Center for Pragmatism Studies
Philosophy Graduate Program
Departament of Philosophy
Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo - Brazil