November 8th to 11th, 2004

Malcom Guimarães Rodrigues
malcomtatu@hotmail.com
UNESP - Brazil

SELF-ORGANIZATION THEORY, SELF-MISTAKE, AND PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION

ABSTRACT
Our aim is an analysis of self-deceiving/ self-mistake[?], such as defined by Arruda (1998), under the light of Debrun's Self-Organization Theory (SOT) (1998). The choice of that definition is justified by a pretension of ours for an approach in the action domain. This pretension is based upon the rejection of another approach, which on postulating a irreducibly subjective reality, the "mental reality", relegates to an assumed "transcendental" subject a way of privileged access to the mental states of this very subject. This approach sometimes turns a form of introspection into its study method. On the contrary, we take off from self-deceiving, because it is characterized in Arruda's definition as conduct. The self-deceiving subject is that which (undeclaredly) doubts of what he or she states, in such a way that the fact of ignoring those doubts by making assertions (that is, actions) is what characterizes him or her as a self-deceiver. Our hypothesis is that the occurrence of such doubts can be explained trough the notion of subject suggested by the SOT. According to this theory, the individual could be not a controlling center, in determined moments of his or her interaction with the means, in the process by which his or her "personal history" is being constructed. If this "personal history" has a relevant role in the subject's actions, and if he or she does not have plain control over it, we see the possibility of under specific circumstances the subject not being sure of (or not being able to control) part of his or her statements. These "specific circumstances" are those which can give the occasion to self-deceiving.

KEYWORDS: Self-deceiving; Self-organization; Action Philosophy.

Center for Pragmatism Studies
Philosophy Graduate Program
Departament of Philosophy
Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo - Brazil